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Is There Private Information in the FX Market? 






1.  Introduction 
It is a common view that private information in the foreign exchange market does not exist.  This 
paper evaluates this view by examining how trading affects volatility.  In particular, we examine 
the Tokyo foreign exchange (FX) market, which until recently was restricted from trading over 
the lunch break from 12:00 to 1:30.  For that ninety minutes, the Tokyo interbank market shut 
down.  On December 22, 1994, this restriction was abolished.
1  The removal of the restriction 
thus provides a natural experiment regarding the effects of trading on volatility. 
  It is well known that the variance of equity returns is more than ten times larger when 
markets are open than when closed (see Fama (1965), Oldfield and Rogalski (1980), and French 
and Roll (1986), among others).  French and Roll posit three possible sources: (1) public 
information that arrives during business hours, (2) private information that enters price through 
trading, and (3) pricing errors that occur during trading.  They examine stock market closures 
during which there is no change in the flow of public information to determine the importance of 
the public information source.  They find that return volatility decreases significantly during these 
closures, which is inconsistent with public information being the sole source of volatility.  Rather, 
private information appears to be the main source of high trading-time volatility (they find only a 
small role for pricing errors). 
  The analysis of this paper has two stages.  The first stage is similar in spirit to the equity 
analysis of French and Roll (1986) in that we compare volatility within a given interval across 
regimes.  Our analysis differs, however, in an important way: we are addressing a market whose 
information structure is more skewed toward public information.  In fact, it is a common view 
that all participants in the FX market are projecting on the same public information set (except, 
perhaps, at times of central bank intervention).  Nevertheless, we find results similar to French 
                                                           
1 This trading hour restriction was imposed by The Committee of Tokyo Foreign Exchange Market Customs, which is 
composed of representatives from commercial banks, foreign banks, and FX brokers.  It was thus a voluntary 
regulation by market participants rather than Ministry of Finance guidance.  The restriction was introduced in 1972 
after the yen exited the Bretton Woods system.  The reason the restriction was abolished—according to news reports—
was to regain the substantial volume that had migrated to other, unrestricted locations (e.g., Singapore and Hong 
Kong).  The decision to lift the restriction was made on December 21, and implemented on the following day. 
Restrictions on trading before 9 a.m. and after 3:30 p.m. were also abolished on December 22.   2
and Roll’s: lunch-hour volatility is twice as high with trading, without any change in the release 
of public information.  Given the perceived predominance of public information, this result is 
striking.
2  
  The second stage of our analysis moves beyond comparing lunch-hour volatility across 
regimes.  In the second stage, we examine the regime shift’s effect on the pattern of volatility 
over the trading day.  This allows us to link our analysis to the literature on the U-shape of 
intraday volatility.  That work has established that volatility over the day is U-shaped in many 
markets.
3  And recent theory in the area can rationalize the U-shape, most of it relying on some 
type of private information.
4  Empirical work, however, has only recently moved from document-
ing the phenomenon to determining if private information is indeed involved.  Here we address 
the link between the U-shape and information by comparing the U-shape before and after the 
introduction of lunch-hour trading.  For example, most models relying on private information 
predict a flattening of the U-shape: allowing trading induces greater revelation during the lunch 
hour, with a smaller share remaining for the morning and afternoon.    
  For concreteness, we offer a working definition of the term private information.  By 
private information we mean any non-public information that is price relevant.  Non-public 
information is any information that is not common knowledge in the usual sense.  As for price 
relevance, we stress that price relevant information is not necessarily fundamental.  To under-
stand this point, it is helpful to establish a taxonomy of information types that qualify as private 
by our definition.  For the taxonomy, consider a standard two-period, three date trading model in 
which trading occurs at t=0 and t=1, and at t=2 the fundamental value F is realized (e.g., final 
payoffs occur).  Now, by non-public fundamental information we have in mind signals of the 
final payoff F.  We offer two possibilities in the context of FX.  The first involves (unsterilized) 
intervention: the dealer who receives a central bank order has information that other market 
participants do not (see Peiers (1995)).  The second involves aggregation of information in orders 
tied to trade in goods: if a country’s trade balance is a component of fundamental value, then 
dealers receive signals of this component long before published statistics are available (see Lyons 
(1995b)).
5  In contrast, by price relevant private information that is not fundamental we have in 
                                                           
2 The fact that many markets exhibit relatively low volatility over the lunch period does not weaken this result since we 
are measuring the change in volatility from the change in regime; we are not making a statement about the absolute 
level, so controlling for a “natural” decline over the lunch period is not necessary. 
3 Evidence of the U-shape pattern of intraday volatility appears in Wood, McInish, and Ord (1985), Harris (1986), and 
Andersen and Bollerslev (1994), among many others. 
4 See Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Foster and Viswanathan (1990), and Hong and Wang (1995), among others. 
5 A refinement that is relevant to both of these types of order-flow information lies in its distribution, for example its 
distribution across dealers.  Since the transparency of FX trades is low, order flow remains private information even 
after being conveyed to counterparties through trading (see, e.g., Lyons (1995b) and Romer (1993)).    3
mind information that is unrelated to F but is relevant to the interim price at t=1.  We offer two 
possibilities in the context of FX.  The first involves digestion effects that arise when risk sharing 
is incomplete: for example, dealer positions uncorrelated with F will be price relevant if it is 
known that positions are closed at day’s end and that these (net) trades affect price (see Lyons 
(1995a)).  The second involves the presence of differential prior beliefs in FX: Kraus and Smith 
(1994) show that beliefs about beliefs affect t=1 prices even when it is common knowledge that 
no participant has private information about final payoffs at t=2.   
  The two bodies of work most closely related to this paper are those concerning (i) 
volatility dynamics in the FX market and (ii) volatility effects of opening/closing in other 
markets.  The first emphasizes volatility dynamics across both trading centers and time.
6  A 
central result is that volatility generally propagates from one trading center to the next (e.g., a 
volatile Tokyo market is typically followed by a volatile New York market — the so-called 
“meteor shower” effect).  The seminal work in the second area on opening/closing effects is the 
French and Roll (1986) paper on the closing of the NYSE.  One later paper in this second area 
that is particularly relevant is Ito and Lin (1992).  That paper examines the effects on stock price 
volatility of the lunch closing of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  (Note that there is no change in the 
lunch break in that case; the authors address the effects of its presence.)  Surprisingly, they find 
no evidence of an intraday U-shape in volatility.  This is surprising because a U-shape is evident 
on the NYSE, but the NYSE does not break for lunch. 
  The rest of the paper is divided into four sections.  Section 2 summarizes the relevant 
theory and information specifications.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 presents our 
results.  And Section 5 concludes. 
                                                           
6 See, e.g., Engle, Ito, and Lin (1990), Baillie and Bollerslev (1991), Ito, Engle, and Lin (1992), Dacorogna et al. 
(1993), and Hogan and Melvin (1994).   4
2.  Experiment Design 
2.a.  Stage 1: Testing for the presence of private information 
  The first stage of our analysis is in the spirit of French and Roll (1986).  In this first stage 
we test whether FX volatility is caused solely by public information.  To do this, we test whether 
lunch-hour volatility is affected by the introduction of trading.  If there is no change in the flow 
of public information at the time the restriction is removed, then volatility should not be affected 
as long as volatility is caused solely by public information.  The alternative is that this market is 
not driven purely by public information, in which case volatility should increase with the 
introduction of trading.   
  Clearly, an important concern in interpreting the results is whether the flow of public 
information changed across the two regimes.  If it does, and if the change over the lunch-hour is 
an increase, then an increase in volatility might be spuriously attributed to private information.  
We offer three arguments that the flow of public information did not change with the regime 
shift.  First, the decision to abolish the restrictions on trading was not part of a broader policy-
reform package; rather, it was an isolated change in regime.  Second, the decision was not the 
work of the Ministry of Finance (MOF).  It came from The Committee of Tokyo Foreign 
Exchange Market Customs (see footnote 1).  It is thus difficult to argue that it might have 
correlated with MOF initiatives more broadly.  Finally, we have reviewed the schedule for public 
release of relevant macro data and find no changes within our sample either toward or away from 
the midday period.
7  
  To summarize our first hypothesis, its test, and the alternative, we have: 
 
H.1:  Volatility in the FX market is caused solely by public information. 
Test:  V closed V open l
Y
l
Y () ( ) =  
AH.1:  V closed V open l
Y
l
Y () ( ) <  
 
where Vl
Y  is the return variance of the yen/dollar rate over the lunch period from 12:00-1:30, 
Tokyo time.  The closed sample corresponds to the period before removal of the trading 
                                                           
7 For example, we checked the number of news reports over the 12-1:30 period on the Reuters Money Market Headline 
News screen.  In the thirty trading days before the lunch-hour opening, there were 18.5 reports on average.  In the 
thirty trading days after the lunch-hour opening, there were 17.5 reports on average (precise dates correspond to our 
sampling convention, described below).   5
restriction (i.e., before December 22, 1994).  The open sample corresponds to the period after 
removal of the restriction. 
  Our second stage-one hypothesis is directed at the fact that the Tokyo experiment is not a 
pure regime shift (closed to open) since there were alternative markets where Tokyo participants 
could trade during the restricted ninety minutes.  Singapore, in particular, is open during the 
Tokyo trading day, and can execute FX transactions originating in Tokyo over the lunch break.
8  
Nevertheless, under the restriction overall depth in yen/dollar was sharply lower over the break.  
If depth went to zero over the break, our test would be more powerful.  That depth does not go to 
zero does not, however, bias our test.   
  There is a way to measure this power loss, and at the same time check the robustness of 
our test of hypothesis 1.  Note that in Tokyo yen/dollar trading is much higher relative to 
mark/dollar trading than in Singapore or Hong Kong (data provided below).  This relative 
importance provides a way to measure the importance of Singapore and Hong Kong as alternative 
trading venues.  Per above, the power of our test depends on the degree to which depth drops 
from the Tokyo break.  Taking Tokyo off line causes a much sharper drop in the depth of 
yen/dollar than in the depth of mark/dollar (since Tokyo trading in far more yen/dollar intensive).  
Though we expect the effect on volatility in these two markets to have the same sign, the 
magnitude should be greater in the case of yen/dollar.   
  To summarize our second hypothesis and test, we have: 
 
H.2:  If volatility is induced from trading, then mark/dollar volatility over the lunch-hour 
should increase when the Tokyo market opens, but by less than the increase in yen/dollar 
volatility. 
 
Test:  V closed V open l
M
l
M ()( ) <  
and 







Y () ( )() ( ) >  
 
where Vl
M  is the return variance of the mark/dollar rate over the lunch period from 12:00-1:30, 
Tokyo time. 
 
                                                           
8 Japanese newspapers report that there was indeed migration of lunch-hour trading to Singapore and Hong Kong 
before the restriction was abolished.   6
2.b.  Stage 2: Identifying  types of private information from changes in the U-shape 
  The second stage of our analysis moves beyond simply documenting higher lunch-hour 
volatility.  The objective of this stage is to discriminate between the types of private information 
that might cause the volatility effects we find in testing hypotheses 1 and 2.  We do this by 
examining how the U-shape of intraday volatility is affected by the introduction of lunch-hour 
trading.   
  There are three key dimensions to shifts in the U-shaped curve: (1) does the curve flatten 
or curl? (2) does the curve rise or fall? and (3) does the curve tilt up or down?  The answers to 
these questions provide valuable evidence regarding the nature of the private information 
involved.   
  Our third hypothesis and test summarizes the implications of recent theory with respect to 
flattening the U-shape: 
 
H.3:  If volatility is caused by the revelation of information in the trading process, then opening 
lunch-hour trading should flatten the U-shape of intraday volatility. 







Y () () ( ) ( ) <  
      and 







Y () () ( ) ( ) <  
 
where Vm
Y  and Va
Y  are the yen/dollar return variances over the morning and afternoon periods, 
respectively (10:30-12:00 and 1:30-3:00, Tokyo time). 
  The second way the U-shaped curve might shift is in its overall level.  A recent paper that 
introduces a helpful taxonomy here is Romer (1993).  Romer distinguishes between “internal 
news”, which must be aggregated by the trading process, and “external news”, which is reflected 
in price without trading.  We add to this the distinction between short-lived and long-lived 
information.  Private information can be short-lived if a future public signal is expected to reveal 
it.  This induces a front loading of informed trading within a given trading period.  In contrast, 
long-lived private information produces a more even trading pattern, as in Kyle (1985).  Our 
fourth hypothesis employs these information categories to generate implications for the average 
level of volatility over the day. 
   7
H.4:  If volatility is caused by the revelation of information in the trading process, and that 
information is wholly short-lived internal news, then opening lunch-hour trading should 
not effect average volatility over the day. 
Test:  V closed V open
YY () ( ) =  
AH.4:  If the information revealed by the trading process is partly long-lived internal news, then 
opening lunch-hour trading should increase volatility over the day. 
 
where V
Y  is the yen/dollar return variance over all three subperiods (10:30-3:00, Tokyo time). 
  The fifth and last of our hypotheses addresses the third way in which the U-shaped curve 
might shift: tilting either up or down.  If volatility is redirected toward the afternoon, we should 
find a tilting up;  if it is redirected toward the morning, a tilting down. 
 
H.5:  If the information revealed by the trading process is partly short-lived, then opening 
lunch-hour trading should raise afternoon volatility relative to morning volatility, tilting 
the U-shape upward. 







Y () () ( ) ( ) >  
 
2.c.  An additional consideration 
  There is a complication that derives from the date of the regulatory change (December 
22).  Traditionally, the Christmas week is one of the least representative since most businesses 
and currency dealers take vacation (from just before Christmas through New Year’s day).     
Hence, a standard before-versus-after comparison is not a clean test because there is a strong 
seasonal in the holiday period following the change in regime in our data.   
  We use two methods to correct for this seasonal.  With the first, we omit from the after 
sample the business days between December 22 and January 2.  In the end, we find no substan-
tive effect on our results from this correction.  (This is the correction used for our reported 
results.)  The second method we examined is comparing before and after results over intervals 
exactly one year apart.  Though this clearly eliminates the seasonal, the resulting larger gap 
between the sub-samples introduces other factors that are difficult to control.  In any case, lunch-
hour volatility is significantly higher in the after sample using this method as well. 
 
3.  Data   8
3.a.  Exchange rate data 
  The yen/dollar and mark/dollar rates we use are the indicative spot quotes posted on the 
Reuters FXFX screen between 29 September 1994 and 28 March 1995 (the first and last dates of 
our longest sampling interval).  Our source for these series is Olsen & Associates (Zurich).  Each 
bid-offer quote is time stamped to the second.  (For more details regarding the capture and 
cleaning of the data, see Dacorogna et al. (1993).  For more on their indicative nature, see 
Goodhart (1989) and Goodhart, Ito, and Payne (1996)). 
  Though the indicative quotes have their shortcomings, our method of use minimizes our 
exposure.  Specifically, the variance ratios require only the exchange rate series themselves (bid-
offer midpoint).  This is the dimension of the data that Goodhart, Ito, and Payne (1996) find 
provides the most accurate measure of the underlying market analogue (cf the series for the 
indicative spread and the frequency of quote entry).    
 
3.b.  The Tokyo and Singapore markets 
  According to the tri-annual survey of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the 
daily turnover of the Tokyo FX market in the month of April 1995 was $161 billion.  Of this, 
roughly 80 percent was interbank (i.e., interdealer), either done directly or through brokers (the 
remaining 20% being customer-dealer trades).
9  By currency, yen/dollar accounts for 76% and the 
mark/dollar accounts for 12%.  In Singapore, the daily turnover was $105 billion over the same 
period.  By currency, yen/dollar accounts for 30% and mark/dollar accounts for 32%.
10 
                                                           
9 We write “roughly” 80% because the BIS report includes a third category of participant called other financial 
institutions.  This category includes nonreporting banks, which in many countries includes investment banks, some of 
which are important in dealing.  That dealers are included in this category is evidenced by the significant brokered 
trading of this category: only dealers have access to brokers in this market. 
10 Singapore’s currency breakdown is from the 1992 BIS Survey (the 1995 results for the breakdown in Singapore are 
not yet available to us).   9
4.  Results and Discussion 
4.a.  Stage 1 results:  The volatility effects from the regime shift 
  Our stage one analysis includes the testing of hypotheses 1 and 2.  The test of hypothesis 
1 is a test of whether volatility rises over the lunch hour from 12 to 1:30 after the opening of trade 
(i.e., after the removal of the restriction on 22 December 1994).  We test this by calculating the 
ratio of the lunch-hour variance when open to the lunch-hour variance when closed, and testing 
whether this ratio is greater than one.  Table 1 presents the results. 
  The first column presents the number of trading days in both the closed and open samples 
(i.e., the before and after samples).  For example, the dates of the 20 day before sample are the 
weekdays from November 24 to December 21, 1994 and the dates of the 20 day after sample are 
the weekdays from January 4, 1995 to January 31, 1995 (holiday week omitted—see section 2.c.).  
Note that 20 trading days corresponds roughly to one trading month.  The second column 
presents the variance ratios, open to closed.  The variance ratios are calculated from returns 
measured as the change in the log of the bid-offer midpoint.  P-values for the null that the 
variance ratios equal one are not included because in all three cases they are zero to two decimal 
places (i.e., less than 0.5%).   
  These results are strong evidence that lunch-hour volatility does indeed rise with the 
opening of trade.  In fact, return variance roughly doubles.  This is a clear rejection of the null 
that volatility in FX is caused solely by public information.   
  Our test of hypothesis 2 is a test of whether mark/dollar volatility also rises over the 
lunch hour, but by less than the rise of yen/dollar volatility.  Recall that this implication is 
motivated by the presence of alternative trading venues available during the Tokyo market 
closure.  We expect a smaller rise in mark/dollar volatility because mark/dollar is relatively 
unimportant in Tokyo, implying a smaller effect from bringing Tokyo back on line.  Table 2 
presents the results. 
  As in Table 1, the first column presents the number of trading days in both the closed and 
open samples.  The second column presents the variance ratios, open to closed, in the case of 
mark/dollar over the lunch hour.  P-values for the null that these ratios equal one are in parenthe-
ses.  The last column presents the difference between the corresponding ratio from Table 1 for the 
yen/dollar rate and the ratio for the mark/dollar rate in column two.  (P-values are not presented 
for this column because the resulting statistic is the difference between two F-statistics, requiring 
Monte Carlo methods, which we have not yet performed).     10
  Note that volatility also rises significantly in the case of mark/dollar, but by less than 
yen/dollar.  Thus, we cannot reject hypothesis 2, providing further evidence that volatility is 
induced from trading, and that the source is not public information. 
 
4.b.  Stage 2 results:  The pattern of volatility over the day 
  Stage 2 of our analysis moves beyond showing that lunch-hour volatility rises with the 
opening of trade.  Here, we examine how the U-shape of volatility over the day is affected by the 
lunch-hour opening.  There are three questions we address: (1) does the curve flatten or curl? (2) 
does the curve rise or fall? and (3) does the curve tilt up or down?  The answers to these questions 
provide evidence regarding the type of private information involved.   
  Our third hypothesis concerns the first of these questions.  If volatility is caused by the 
revelation of information in the trading process, then opening lunch-hour trading should flatten 
the U-shape of intraday volatility.  Table 3 presents our results.  This table presents relative 
variance ratios for the yen/dollar rate over three intraday periods: morning, lunch, and afternoon 
(10:30-12:00, 12:00-1:30, and 1:30-3:00 Tokyo time, respectively).  The second column presents 
the lunch-to-morning variance ratio after the opening relative to the lunch-to-morning variance 
ratio before the opening.  The third column presents the lunch-to-afternoon variance ratio after 
the opening relative to the lunch-to-afternoon variance ratio before the opening.  P-values for the 
ratio=1 null are zero to two decimal places for the component variance ratios (i.e., less than 
0.5%). 
  The results clearly indicate a flattening of the U-shape.  To see this, note that the 
denominators imply that lunch return variance is substantially less than both morning and 
afternoon variance in the closed sample (i.e., the before sample).  After trade is opened, however, 
lunch variance rises relative to both morning and afternoon variance, as indicated by the 
numerators being higher than the denominators in all cases.  Because the numerators remain less 
than one, the U-shaped curve is not flattened completely. 
  Our fourth hypothesis concerns whether the intraday volatility curve rises or falls on 
average.  In formulating it, we referred to information types that have different implications for 
the average level of volatility over the day.  Specifically, if the information driving trading-time 
volatility is wholly short-lived internal news, then opening lunch-hour trading should not effect 
average volatility over the day.  In contrast, if the information revealed by the trading process is 
partly long-lived internal news, then opening lunch-hour trading should increase volatility over 
the day.  Table 4 presents our results.   11
  The second column implies that the U-shaped volatility curve does rise on average.  This 
column presents the return variance ratio for the yen/dollar rate over all three periods (10:30-3:00 
Tokyo time).  In all cases, the P-value for the null that the ratio equals one is zero to two decimal 
places.  (Note, however, that these relative increases in variance are much smaller than those that 
occur over the lunch hour, per Table 1.)  Thus, we have evidence that short-lived information is 
not the whole story, at least to the extent that the opportunity to profit from such information is 
dissipated by the end of the trading day. 
  Our fifth hypothesis concerns whether the intraday volatility curve tilts up or down with 
the opening of lunch-hour trade.  If volatility is redirected toward the afternoon, we should find a 
tilting up;  if it is redirected toward the morning, a tilting down.  For interpretation, if the 
information revealed by the trading process is partly short-lived, then opening lunch-hour trading 
should raise afternoon volatility relative to morning volatility, tilting the U-shape upward.  Table 
5 presents our results. 
  Columns two and three indicate that the U-shaped volatility curve does indeed tilt 
upward.  Column two presents the morning variance ratio.  Column three presents the afternoon 
variance ratio.  Note from column two that there is evidence that the morning variance actually 
falls slightly after opening lunch-hour trade.  In contrast, the afternoon variance clearly rises after 
opening lunch-hour trade.  This result, in conjunction with the previous result, suggests that 
short-lived information is indeed being revealed in the trading process, though it is not the only 
type of information being revealed as internal news (in the sense of Romer (1993)). 
 
4.c.  Discussion 
  So how do these results inform us about trading in FX?  Consider three ways of thinking 
about the stage one results.  One view regards FX as perfectly competitive, driven by public 
information, and nearly infinitely deep (order flow has virtually no price impact).  Order flow is 
liquidity-motivated under this view, coming from customers and from dealers trading for 
inventory control purposes.  In this case, opening midday trade in Tokyo does not affect 
volatility.  A second view admits a role for private information in FX, but considers the drop in 
depth as resulting primarily from less liquidity trading in Tokyo since the informed would simply 
choose to route their trades to Singapore over the break.  With little decline in informed trading 
midday, the opening of midday trade in Tokyo should have little impact on volatility.  A third 
view also admits a role for private information, but regards the drop in depth as largely from 
reduced trading by the informed.  (An example is information that is communicated in bilateral   12
transaction patterns among familiar players.  In this case, transactions in Tokyo are inherently 
different from transactions in Singapore, and the informed may not trade in Singapore because of 
unfamiliarity with the counterparties.)  This reduction in the trading of the informed over the 
lunch break reduces volatility.  Our results support this third view.   13
5.  Conclusions 
  We reject the view that private information in FX does not exist.  Our strong rejection 
comes from the fact that lunch-hour return variance roughly doubles after the opening of trade.  
Thus, the view that traders of FX project exclusively on the same public information needs to be 
relaxed.  Relaxing this view is made easier by recognizing that private, price-relevant information 
need not be private fundamental information (per our introduction). 
  Examining the regime shift’s effect on the U-shape of volatility over the day yields 
further results.  In particular, we find that opening lunch-hour trade alters the U-shape in three 
ways: the curve is (1) flatter, (2) tilted upward, and (3) higher on average.  The flattening of the 
curve is supportive of the presence of private information that must be aggregated in the trading 
process (or internal news, in the sense of Romer (1993)).  The flattening occurs because allowing 
trading induces greater revelation during the lunch hour, with a smaller share remaining for the 
morning and afternoon.  The fact that the curve tilts sharply upward is supportive of a predomi-
nant role for short-lived private information.  The tilt upward occurs because opening trade over 
lunch reduces the incentive to front-load informed trading in order to avoid a lunch-hour signal 
that dissipates its value.  Finally, the raising of volatility on average suggests that at least some of 
the private information being aggregated through trading is long-lived.  Here, by long-lived we 
mean information whose value is not fully dissipated at the end of the trading day by the arrival 
of public information (see, e.g., Foster and Viswanathan (1990)).   14
Table 1 
 
Lunch-Hour Yen/Dollar Variance Ratio 
 
This table presents the return variance ratio for the yen/dollar rate over the lunch-hour (12-1:30 Tokyo 
time).  The numerator of the ratio is the lunch-hour return variance after the lunch market opened (i.e., after 
December 22, 1994); the denominator is the lunch-hour return variance before the opening.  The returns 
are calculated as the change in the log of the bid-offer midpoint.  The left-hand column describes the length 
of the before and after samples.  For example, the dates of the 20 day before sample are the weekdays from 
November 24 to December 21, 1994 and the dates of the 20 day after sample are the weekdays from 
January 4, 1995 to January 31, 1995 (holiday week omitted).  P-values for the ratio=1 null are zero to two 
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Table 2 
 
Lunch-Hour Mark/Dollar Variance Ratio 
 
This table presents the return variance ratio for the mark/dollar rate over the lunch-hour (12-1:30 Tokyo 
time).  The numerator of the ratio is the lunch-hour return variance after the lunch market opened (i.e., after 
December 22, 1994); the denominator is the lunch-hour return variance before the opening.  The returns 
are calculated as the change in the log of the bid-offer midpoint.  The left-hand column describes the 
before and after samples.  For example, the dates of the 20 day before sample are the weekdays from 
November 24 to December 21, 1994 and the dates of the 20 day after sample are the weekdays from 
January 4, 1995 to January 31, 1995 (holiday week omitted).  The second column presents the variance 
ratio for the mark/dollar rate.  The third column presents the difference between the corresponding ratio 
from Table 1 for the yen/dollar rate and the ratio for the mark/dollar rate in column two.  P-values for the 
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2.27 - 1.11  =  1.16 
 
 






2.04 - 1.23  =  0.81 
 
 







2.13 - 1.96  =  0.17 
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Table 3 
 
Does Lunch-Hour Trading Flatten the U-Shape? 
 
This table presents relative variance ratios for the yen/dollar rate over three intraday periods: morning, 
lunch, and afternoon (10:30-12:00, 12:00-1:30, and 1:30-3:00 Tokyo time, respectively).  The returns are 
calculated as the change in the log of the bid-offer midpoint.  The left-hand column describes the before 
and after samples.  For example, the dates of the 20 day before sample are the weekdays from November 
24 to December 21, 1994 and the dates of the 20 day after sample are the weekdays from January 4, 1995 
to January 31, 1995 (holiday week omitted).  The second column presents the lunch-to-morning variance 
ratio after the lunch-hour market opened relative to the lunch-to-morning variance ratio before the opening.  
The third column presents the lunch-to-afternoon variance ratio after the lunch-hour market opened relative 
to the lunch-to-afternoon variance ratio before the opening.  P-values for the ratio=1 null are zero to two 















 20 days 
  
0.64 / 0.22  =  2.91 
 
  
0.56 / 0.38  =  1.47 
 
 
 40 days 
 
  
0.66 / 0.26  =  2.54 
 
  
0.62 / 0.37  =  1.68 
 
 
 60 days 
  




0.51 / 0.32  =  1.59 
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Table 4 
 
Does Lunch-Hour Trading Raise the U-Shape? 
 
This table presents the return variance ratio for the yen/dollar rate over all three periods (10:30-3:00 Tokyo 
time).  The numerator of the ratio is the return variance after the lunch-hour market opened (i.e., after 
December 22, 1994); the denominator is the return variance before the opening.  The returns are calculated 
as the change in the log of the bid-offer midpoint.  The left-hand column describes the length of the before 
and after samples.  For example, the dates of the 20 day before sample are the weekdays from November 
24 to December 21, 1994 and the dates of the 20 day after sample are the weekdays from January 4, 1995 
to January 31, 1995 (holiday week omitted).  P-values for the ratio=1 null are zero to two decimal places in 
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Table 5 
 
Does Lunch-Hour Trading Tilt the U-Shape? 
 
This table presents the return variance ratio for the yen/dollar rate over the morning and afternoon periods 
(10:30-12:00 and 1:30-3:00 Tokyo time, respectively).  The numerator of the ratio is the return variance 
after the lunch-hour market opened (i.e., after December 22, 1994); the denominator is the return variance 
before the opening.  The returns are calculated as the change in the log of the bid-offer midpoint.  The left-
hand column describes the before and after samples.  For example, the dates of the 20 day before sample 
are the weekdays from November 24 to December 21, 1994 and the dates of the 20 day after sample are the 
weekdays from January 4, 1995 to January 31, 1995 (holiday week omitted).  The second column presents 
the variance ratio for the morning period.  The third column presents the variance ratio for the afternoon 
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